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Brian R. Gallini*
I began my foray into the academic world in the fall of 2006 at
Temple University’s Beasley School of Law. Although the
transition into academia was a more challenging one than I
anticipated (who else gets tired of hearing “well, at least you’ve
got your summers off”?), I found the exercise simultaneously
strenuous, exhausting, and ultimately rewarding. After two years
at Temple, however, my full transition into academia was hardly
fully complete.
In the spring of 2008, I excitedly concluded the nauseating law
teaching hiring process1 by accepting a tenure-track offer from the
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville. Other than the obvious relief
of ending the hiring process,2 I was elated to receive a course
package that included all criminal courses, including first-year
criminal law. The prospect of teaching criminal law in the first
year raised numerous questions, like the following: (1) how many
credits does the course receive; (2) what should I include in the
syllabus; (3) how much of what is in the syllabus must I cover; (4)
even if the students forget the many nuances of the course, what do
I want them to take away; and the obvious coming from an
easterner like me…where exactly is Fayetteville?
In this essay, I humbly offer some thoughts – from the “newbie’s”
standpoint – for your consideration in response to each of these
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By the way, has anyone ever come up with a worse way to go about
hiring? Let’s be candid: who decided it would be a good idea to have every
candidate interested in law teaching descend once a year on a single poorly laid
out hotel for a three-day “conference” during which candidates must engage in
awkward thirty-minute preliminary interviews with panels of faculty from each
interested school? Perhaps the better question is how that person got every law
school in the nation to respond by saying something like, “yeah, that sounds like
a process that will simultaneously be relaxing and lead to the hiring of collegial
and productive faculty without any sense of regret.”
2

My anecdotal research reflects that only about 1.5% of lawyers teach
and only about 0.7% have tenure track positions. Richard E. Redding, “Where
Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and its
Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 595 (2003).
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questions. I conclude with some limited comments (reminders?)
directed gently to my senior colleagues about teaching this
generation of first-year law students.
Course Credit
Students at the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville complete the
Criminal Law course in the first semester of their first year and
earn three credits for doing so. This, as I understand it, is the
norm. The better question raised by this portion of the essay is
whether the course should actually receive four credits. Indeed,
perhaps the minority number of law schools that award four credits
to students for completing the course have it right.3 Unlike some
critics who view teaching criminal law as irrelevant at worst and
unimportant at best,4 I tend to view the criminal curriculum as
evolving and socially relevant. Let me briefly address only the
criminal law professors who teach a three-credit criminal law
course: how many of you have covered the death penalty in any
depth? Do any of you include a unit at the end of the course (or
anywhere) briefly sensitizing students to your state’s criminal
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See Florida State University College of Law Criminal Course
Description,
http://www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/curriculum/CriminalLaw.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009) ; Cornell University First Year Courses,
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/admissions/degrees/jd/1l.cfm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009).
4

See generally Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1
OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 261 (2003). Professor Husak contends that the criminal
law is unimportant for essentially two reasons. First, Husak argues, even
knowledgeable professors of criminal law cannot predict the fate of criminal
defendants because the “real” criminal law “is in the hands of police and
prosecutors.” Id. at 266. Indeed, Husak continues, “[police and prosecutors] are
constrained by almost nothing in performing their jobs. So what really happens
does not much depend on the content of substantive criminal law. The criminal
law we teach and theorize about turns out not to be very important.” Id. The
easy response to that argument, however, is that both prosecutors and police
must learn the criminal law before being capable of performing their jobs. To
the extent that Husak laments the lack of supervisory authority over police and
prosecutors, that seems more like a generic observation about the problem of
unchecked discretion. That complaint is more properly directed to the criminal
justice system as a whole, rather than substantive criminal law specifically.
Husak’s second fundamental contention is that criminal statutes are
irrelevant given their sheer volume. Id. at 267-68. In other words, Husak
suggests, there are so many statutes in existence that any of us can violate some
law merely by going about our ordinary lives. Id. at 268. But, does that
argument actually suggest the increased importance of a criminal law course?
After all, if so few are aware of statutes that regulate or govern their conduct, it
seems that more education about substantive criminal law is the answer.
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code? How many cover embezzlement? How many even have
time to get to defenses? Personally, I answered those questions
“no”, “no”, “no”, and “no time”.
At a more fundamental level, I also think the criminal law finds a
way to spill into almost every other aspect of our profession. How
many large law firms that have securities regulation/litigation
practices do not have a corresponding white-collar criminal
defense group? I would ask the same question for tax, antitrust,
and real estate practice groups. I raise those questions to suggest
the obvious: the line between non-criminal and criminal behavior
is often tenuous at best. Because of that, many corporate clients
spend an inordinate amount of money to, from a preventative
standpoint, be sure their proposed conduct is not criminal.
I raise the points mentioned in the prior two paragraphs to suggest
the need to dedicate more time to the criminal law as a course.5
Given the self-evident nature of my observations about course
credit, I cannot help but wonder if the “traditional” criminal law
course is just a classic example of law schools’ apathy toward
change. In other words, the familiar “that’s just the way we’ve
always done it” rationale seems to linger in the background.
Syllabus Inclusion
Having just completed my proverbial first time around the track
teaching criminal law, I feel somewhat uniquely qualified to
address what to include in a criminal law syllabus. Well, perhaps
the truth is that I feel qualified to give you my thoughts about what
I included in my syllabus.
Let me say at the outset, though, that no discussion of syllabus
inclusion would be complete without first mentioning the
importance of casebook selection. I will make no attempt to
discuss, analyze, or even suggest an “appropriate” casebook.
Instead, I will only generally observe that far too many criminal
casebooks are, in my opinion, outdated and confusing.6 As to the
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Accord Markus Dirk Dubber, Criminal Law: Reforming American
Penal Law, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 53 (1999) (“The teaching of
substantive criminal law therefore should be extended beyond a single semester
of the first year.”).
6

To be fair, most will recognize that my observations are not limited to
criminal law casebooks. See Matthew T. Bodie, The Future of the Casebook:
An Argument for an Open-Source Approach, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10, 14 (2007)
(“Because [professors’] notion of the proper course materials is likely not to
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first point, today’s students seem uninterested in dedicating weeks
of class – or even a class – to the finer points of retributive or
utilitarian theory. Nor do they appear interested in discussing
eighteenth-century cases from common law courts.7 As a result,
they are even less interested in doing the reading to prepare for
such discussions. As to the second point, students find the vast
majority of casebooks so confusing that they feel obligated to
spend, in some cases, hundreds of dollars on supplementary
materials. To remedy these two problems, let me humbly suggest
a few general rules in the paragraphs that follow to criminal
casebook authors everywhere.
First, start including more helpful material to introduce a
topic/chapter. A law review article raising more questions than
answers does not count. Instead, how about a clear-cut and
concise series of paragraphs/pages that, by way of preview, explain
the law and sensitize students to what legal issues are fairly raised
in the pages that follow. I have never understood, either as a
student or now as a professor, why more casebooks do not do this;
are we professors afraid that the students will actually learn the
material if we tell them what they should know?
Second, excepting Supreme Court cases, restrict inclusion of
decisions more than ten years old as main cases. Surely there is a
more recent case than 1875 to discuss mistake of fact.8 Likewise,
there must be something more relevant to this century than Martin
v. State9 to teach the voluntary act requirement. And, let’s be
clear, if there is no more recent authority, then we should not be
match perfectly with that of the authors, most professors feel the need to ‘edit’
the casebook by leaving out some materials and adding others.”).
7

On this point, I cannot blame my students. As I prepare a course, I
often use my own boredom as a proxy for assigning the materials. In other
words, if the material provided by the casebook bores me, I can confidently
conclude that I have virtually no prayer of engaging my students in the material.
Particularly in the context of foundational common law cases, who can blame
the students for being bored both by the terminology and facts found in these
cases? As to the first point, how often do modern courts use the terms
“prosecutrix”? Or, how about “misprison of felony”? Pope v. State, 396 A.2d
1054 (1979).
As to the second point, when was the last time you read an invigorating
case about a sailor stealing rum? Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox. Crim. Cas. 550
(1877). Then again, how engaging can a set of facts be when they verbosely
center on a defendant who rips a gas meter from a wall? Regina v.
Cunninghum, 2 Q.B. 396 (Court of Criminal Appeal 1957).
8

Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).

9

17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. of App. 1944).
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teaching it. My logic should presumably tell us something about
the modern relevance of legality, various common law crimes, or
the so-called “moral wrong” principle.10
Perhaps I’m
oversimplifying or picking unnecessarily on specific doctrines, but
think more generally about reading cases from the students’
standpoint: “how relevant can this topic be if the best example of
this doctrine comes from a case more than a decade old?” Sure,
there is value to understanding, for example, how the common law
impacts the many facets of the criminal law, but I am not
persuaded that first-semester first-year law students understand or
even need that “value.”
Third, do not include more than roughly five “notes and questions”
after the main case. I have countless times encountered some
version of the following scenario: a two to three page main case
followed by a double-digit number of “notes and questions” spread
across five to six pages. Although a few notes are no doubt
necessary to explain modifications, updates, or nuances in the law
that are omitted from – or unarticulated in – the main case, the use
of more than around five notes suggests the need to select a
different main case.
Fourth, as to the content of notes following the case, please include
more hypotheticals/problems and omit the sets of seemingly
random questions (e.g., “what result if the defendant had a pegleg?”) that can correctly be “answered” only by the casebook
author (as the Teacher’s Manual so often reveals). After all,
criminal law exams will not ask the students to recall the facts,
procedural history, holding, or reasoning of a particular case.
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This past fall, my criminal law students read Garnett v. State, 632
A.2d 797 (Md. 1993), as an example of the moral wrong principle. The
defendant in Garnett was a twenty-year-old man with an I.Q. of 52 who read on
a third-grade level, performed math on a fifth-grade level, and interacted with
others socially at the level of a child aged eleven or twelve. Id. at 574. Mr.
Garnett met Erica Frazier, then aged thirteen, in November or December of
1990. Id. at 575. Approximately four months later, Mr. Garnett knocked on the
door of Erica’s home seeking a ride home. Id. Erica opened her bedroom
window and encouraged Mr. Garnett to climb up. Id. He did and they had
intercourse. Id. The Court of Appeals of Maryland justified affirming Mr.
Garnett’s conviction for statutory rape, at least in part, on the notion that he
deserved punishment for “having . . . violated moral teachings that prohibit sex
outside of marriage.” Id. at 580. Several of my students mused at the prospect
of courts utilizing similar rationale in a more modern case. I have no evidence,
anecdotal or otherwise, to support the notion that courts have uniformly
abandoned the rationale of the moral wrong principle. I nevertheless share my
students’ skepticism that it remains a persuasive rationale for strictly enforcing
statutory rape laws.
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Instead, most of our exams provide students with a set of facts and
ask them to analyze the legal implications of those facts.
Accordingly, it seems to make sense to, after students learn the
legal principle embodied in the main case, test their ability to apply
that principle to differing sets of facts.11
Finally, eliminate all law review articles from first-year criminal
casebooks, particularly those inserted to introduce a new block of
material. Now, some may respond that one of the purposes of the
criminal course is to expose students to the importance of
academic debate and ambiguity in the law. To that, I would say
“fair enough.” But, inserting law review articles in a first-year
criminal casebook seems to put the cart before the horse. In other
words, students do not possess, at this early stage, a command of
the law that would enable them to thoughtfully consider proposals
for reform or adjustment. For good reason, many first-semester
first-year students struggle with the daily two-part task of (1)
grasping the black-letter principle represented by the case du jour,
and (2) understanding how that case/principle fits more broadly
into the course. I hasten to add that clearer and more focused
introductory readings would allow for in-class discussion to grow
more organically into answering many of the same questions
otherwise raised by the academic pieces included in so many
criminal casebooks.
Let me offer a few more direct points about syllabus inclusion.
First, (some more senior professors may want to cover their ears
before reading the heresy in this sentence) if you teach criminal
law in the first semester, consider including in your syllabus some
limited material throughout the semester that exposes students to
your views on how to be successful in law school. Consider, for
example, spending some time throughout the semester on topics
like case briefing,12 note taking, outline drafting, how to study for a
law school exam, and how to write a law school exam.13
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See Craig Anthony, Casebook Review: How Do Law Students Really
Learn? Problem-Solving, Modern Pragmatism, and Property Law, 22 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 891, 902 (1999) (“[W]ith the problem method, there is not only less
disjunction between legal education and the legal profession, but also less
disjunction between classroom education and assessment of students' learning,
than there is with the case method.”).
12

If I have persuaded any of you to spend a few minutes at the
beginning of the semester introducing the concept of how to brief a case in your
class, I commend to you the case of Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., Inc., 147
F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001). This personal injury case involves plaintiff’s
attempt to sue Defendant-Phillips Petroleum for unspecified injuries. Id. at 669.
The remarkable aspect of the case is not the facts, but rather the colorful
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Before you scoff at my suggestion (and I know many of you will),
answer me honestly: how many exams from your most recent
criminal law class did you enjoy reading? Out of the sixty,
seventy, eighty or one-hundred first-year exams you read during
your precious holiday break, how many of them left you nodding
your head saying things like, “now that’s exactly what I was
hoping to see.” Five? Ten? Fifteen? Now ask yourself whether
you would like to see more of those exams. I would hope
everyone answered “of course.”
The question therefore becomes how best to see an across-theboard improvement in the quality of exams. I contend that it
comes from us. Not only should we sensitize students to exactly
what is expected of them at the end of the semester – legally
analyzing a complicated set of facts in a limited period of time – it
is incumbent upon us to show them how to accomplish that task.
After all, how else will students know how to write or study for
your exam unless you tell them? Taking a few minutes at
language the court uses to insult the litigants. In an effort to get you to read the
case, let me tantalize you with some of the opinion’s early remarks:
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case
involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together
delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross
the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which leads
the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both
attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact--complete
with hats, handshakes and cryptic words--to draft their
pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained
paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would be so
charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of
legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed.
Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the
daunting task of deciphering their submissions. With Big
Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devilmay-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge
sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.
Id. at 670. The foregoing comments are merely illustrative (it was hard to
choose just one block quote). Although this case obviously has nothing to do
with criminal law, my experience with it has been uniformly positive. I have
found the case is useful not only to break the ice, but also to get students to
identify salient facts, the holding, and pertinent reasoning.
13

In my opinion, it is also never too early to sensitize students to the
potential problems with, and pitfalls of, our wonderful profession. You might
consider Professor Schiltz’s excellent article as a starting point to do so.
Partrick Schilz, Choices Facing Young Lawyers: On Being a Happy, Healthy,
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52
VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).
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appropriate points in the semester to digress from routine case
discussions in order to address how the concept you just covered
applies to their immediate future (read: on the exam!) will break
up the monotony, thereby energizing and focusing your next
discussion.
Second, at least at the outset, I think any syllabus should focus
broadly on the criminal law by, for example, discussing the
elements of a crime, defenses, or complicity. Spending time on
specific offenses at the expense of more generally applicable topics
risks mistaking first-year students for seasoned practitioners. More
importantly, if the students understand what the elements of an
offense are, then they are ostensibly armed to apply those elements
to any specific offense they may subsequently encounter during the
semester or beyond. To my mind, the procession from broad to
narrow topical coverage makes far more sense than covering a
series of individual offenses.
For my part, I begin with a series of broad topics at the outset of
the semester like the role of the jury, principles of punishment, and
statutory interpretation. With at least something of a foundation in
the course, I thereafter transition into a detailed discussion of each
element of a crime before covering specific crimes. As a result,
before turning our attention to any substantive offense, we cover
actus reus, mens rea, social harm, actual cause, and proximate
cause. From there, I turn the class’s attention to the homicide
materials, followed by rape, attempt liability, conspiracy liability,
accomplice liability, and (time permitting) general defenses to
crime.
Third, you will no doubt notice my inclusion of “rape” in the
course materials and I cannot help but pause briefly in this essay to
suggest that teaching the law of rape should be mandatory in a
first-year criminal course. Although perhaps not as controversial a
course inclusion as it once was,14 the law of rape no doubt remains
– for obvious reasons – a sensitive subject.15 From my limited
14

Compare, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, and
Feminism: Some Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of
Courting Controversy, 48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1143, 1161 n.64 (2004) (“Professor
Tomkovicz recently informed me that notwithstanding his earlier doubts, he
continues to teach rape law . . . .”), with James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching
Rape: Reasons, Risks and Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481, 506 (1992) (“At this
point I am not certain that the law of rape will have a place in my future criminal
law courses.”).
15

Although I recount one of my own “war stories” in more detail
below, Professor Dressler tells a story of a rape discussion in his class that
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experience, though, teaching rape law impresses on students like
no other topic in the course that criminal lawyers confront
challenging moral questions on a daily basis. Exposing students at
this early stage in their law school careers to the difficulty of, for
example, serving as court-appointed counsel to a defendant
accused of forcible rape strikes me as an invaluable digression into
the practical implications of practicing criminal law.
Of course, if they have not figured it out by this point in the class,
the manner in which courts massage the language in forcible rape
statutes reminds students of the value of learning basic statutory
interpretation techniques.16
Of course, other rape cases
demonstrate to students that the presence of a distinct social
climate may dictate a court’s decision regardless of how refined
and persuasive a litigant’s statutory interpretation skills might be.17
The challenging nature of the topic of rape itself creates a charged
atmosphere in the classroom that other topics are simply unable to
replicate.
The resulting discussions, although sometimes
unpredictable, are uniformly rewarding. Indeed, students are
forced to think hard about, for example, whether society should
treat the violent serial rapist differently from the acquaintance
rapist. If the resulting harm to the victim is the same – forcible
non-consensual sexual intercourse – why treat the offenders
differently? If the criminal law should indeed treat these offenders
differently, should it do so at the guilt or sentencing phase?
Perhaps the answers strike you as obvious, but you will no doubt
learn something if you ask the class.
Finally, I will close this section by arguing that we should all take
a hard look at our syllabi in an effort to reduce – not eliminate –

resulted in a fist-fight. Dressler, supra note 14, at 1161. Evidently, the fight
broke out between two male students after a class during which one student
made a comment about the other’s sister who had once been raped. Id. at 1161
n.66. Although Professor Dressler did not consider the inciting student’s
comment “extreme,” he suspected that student’s personality had just as much to
do with the fight as the comment itself. Id. Significantly, Professor Dressler’s
story reminds us that the genesis of unpredictability in the classroom often
comes not from the topic du jour, but rather from class dynamics outside the
classroom.
16

See generally In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (interpreting
the statutory term “force” to include, without more, the act of intercourse).
17

See generally Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979)
(concluding that defendant’s “light choking” of the victim was insufficient to
constitute the “force” needed to sustain defendant’s forcible rape conviction),
rev’d State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
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the amount of attention the common law typically receives in a
criminal law course. On the one hand, students undoubtedly
should be made aware throughout the course of the historic
importance of the common law. Yet, strictly from a practical
standpoint, I am skeptical that any court would ask an attorney to
distinguish current precedent from the common law.
A more pressing classroom concern arises when students start to
ask whether they need to keep track of three different jurisdictional
approaches: (1) the common law, (2) the Model Penal Code, and
(3) more modern statutory reforms. I cannot not help but question
the value of dedicating pieces of several classes to understanding
the common law just to later explain that it is rarely the law in any
jurisdiction anymore and now simply provides the foundation for
many criminal statutes. I think the practical-minded modern
student is apt to think, “well, if it’s not the law anywhere anymore,
why did we spend so much time in class talking about it?”
What should we cover from the syllabus?
The debate of what a professor should (must?) cover from a
syllabus is one that presumably can be heard throughout the
hallowed hallways of law schools nationwide. Does the syllabus
create a contract between professor and student such that the
professor is obligated to cover all topics listed, much like the
student is bound to follow all course policies?18 Or, is it correct
that the syllabus is no more than an aspirational document
designed to provide the students with a structural outline of the
course? Then again, perhaps still others are right that we
professors really owe the students nothing and, as a result, no
syllabus is necessary; we need only provide course readings on a
week-to-week basis. Regardless of who is “right”, all of these
generic questions beg the more specific inquiry into whether the
answer changes when one teaches Criminal Law. Let’s take each
question in turn.
I remember well as a law student having the occasional professor
who, at the end of the semester, would double the reading load and
add classes just to complete the coverage of every topic on the

18

See Paula Wasley, The Syllabus Becomes a Repository of Legalese:
As Dos and Don’ts Get Added, Some Professors Cry ‘Enough’,
http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i27/27a00102.htm (“[T]he notion of the syllabus
as a contract has grown ever more literal, down to a proliferation of fine print
and demands by some professors that students must sign and attest that they
have read and understood.”) (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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syllabus. As a student, I resented those professors as I pored over
fifty plus pages of materials in an effort to prepare for hastily
taught final classes. I wonder now as a professor what prompts my
colleagues to complain, beginning about mid-way through the
semester, “I’m so far behind this semester” or “I’m going to have
to add some make-up classes to get caught up.” Behind according
to . . .? Surely it is incorrect that we professors owe a contractual
duty to cover the totality of the syllabus, even at the expense of the
students’ ability to learn the material.
For that reason, I prefer the second approach: include all topics
most relevant to the course in the syllabus but be clear with the
students at the outset of class that it may not be possible to cover
all listed topics. It must be the case that in-depth coverage of each
topic covered is preferable to some minimal coverage of all topics
listed. My suggestion, of course, makes a few lofty assumptions
about us professors: (1) broadly speaking, we genuinely want our
students to learn the material; (2) more specifically, the only
reason it may take longer than it should to cover a particular topic
is that we are responding to a perceived difficulty the class is
having with that topic; and (3) we are teaching the material
provided on our syllabus in an organized fashion.
But, is there any merit to the third approach – offering students the
readings on a weekly basis or releasing the syllabus in chunks? I
think not.
Most students, especially law students, crave
organization and a sense of direction, and only a well-organized
syllabus can provide that. Providing the readings on a weekly
basis, releasing a syllabus in chunks, and/or issuing different
“versions” of a syllabus all detract from the certainty that busy,
anxious, and sometimes overwhelmed first-year law students no
doubt deserve. It also seems reasonable for a student to view a
professor’s use of these approaches as a poor reflection of that
professor’s organization.
How do these observations apply to teaching the criminal law? In
other words, do these thoughts apply any more strongly to the
criminal law as a subject? I’m not sure. On the one hand, I would
argue that Criminal Law as a course is one of the more abstract
courses students will encounter in their first year. For that reason,
perhaps the need for a well-organized guiding syllabus is amplified
in the context of criminal law. Yet, it seems eminently reasonable
– without regard to the amorphous nature of the subject material –
for students to demand clarity and organization from their
professors at all stages and most particularly from the course
materials. I guess the true answer to my question about what we as
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professors should cover from the syllabus boils down to a strategic
choice of what core points we want students to take away from our
classes.
What’s the point?
The end of the foregoing section begs the question: what is, or
should be, the point of teaching criminal law? Does the criminal
law course help prepare students for criminal practice, or should
we even care about that in a first-year class? Alternatively, is it
appropriate to “teach to the bar”?
I am not persuaded that, taught as a first-year class, the Criminal
Law course can reasonably be expected to help prepare students
for life as a criminal practitioner. To be sure, some basic
knowledge in the course cannot hurt a student’s quest to become a
criminal lawyer. But, I think most graduates would agree that the
first year is ultimately such a blur of stress, emotion, and anxiety
that it is difficult for them to recall anything of substance later in
life. This seems a fair response. A new environment, perhaps a
new city, and a new style of learning – to name but a few changes
first-year students typically encounter – all come together in one
perfect storm to make the transition into law school, by itself, a
challenging endeavor.
Perhaps a more fundamental question, though, is why the
Academy should even be interested in teaching the Criminal Law
course to help prepare students for life as criminal lawyers. After
all, what’s the point of the first-year curriculum anyway? From a
doctrinal course standpoint, surely it is not mastery of all subjects
taught in the first year; rather, we are hoping that students learn (1)
how to read and what to look for in a judicial opinion, (2) some
basic understanding of statutory interpretation, (3) how to think on
their feet, (4) how to assert, defend, and consider competing
positions,19 and (5) how the creation/implementation of the law
interacts at every stage with societal, historical, or even political
norms. All of these things are designed to – all together now – get
students to “think like a lawyer.” Subjects taught in the first year
seem more properly understood as vehicles to help achieve these
lofty goals.

19

Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood
Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 997 (2005) (“The most
important feature of a legal education is that it challenges our views and forces
us to examine them with care.”).
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We have yet to identify the goal of teaching criminal law
specifically. Maybe, as I suggested earlier, it is to help prepare
students for the bar exam. This too seems an unrealistic and
undesirable goal. At the outset, we should attempt to define what
it means to “teach to the bar.” After all, law school curriculum
decisions to some extent already create, as an institutional priority,
the goal of helping students pass the bar.20 The Arkansas bar, for
example, tests inter alia the following subjects: Contracts/Sales,
Criminal Law/Procedure, Evidence, Real Property, and Torts.
True to form, the first-year curriculum at the University of
Arkansas School of Law requires that students take Criminal Law,
Property, Civil Procedure, and Torts.21 I think we can agree that
some version of this curricular approach exists in every law school.
Perhaps, then, one correct approach to a first-year criminal course
in Arkansas is to construct the class from bar exams past. Indeed,
we can imagine structuring a course in this manner by (1)
sensitizing students to the existence of the bar exam; (2) educating
them about the differences between the Multi-State portion of the
exam and the state specific essay questions; (3) organizing the
course materials around the criminal law topics tested most
frequently by the State and MBE (even the outdated topics!); and
(4) focusing class discussions on review questions and test
strategies. I will forego making the obvious comment about how
the final exam might look.
Before making a few specific observations about why this
approach is problematic, let’s first put the bar exam in context.
Admittedly, the exam is at once stressful, overwhelming, and
intimidating. But, at bottom, the exam is a bare minimum
competency licensing examination. It strikes me that, as educators,
we should not concern ourselves with the minimums. Rather, it
seems wholly reasonable and worthwhile for the academy to solely
concern itself with fostering better ways of creating skill-laden,
thoughtful, and highly ethical attorneys. If law schools are
successful in consistently graduating students with these attributes,
then surely the bar exam will take care of itself.

20

The ABA contributes to a significant extent to this institutional goal.
Program of Legal Education § 301(a) (2009) (“A law school shall maintain an
educational program that prepares its students for admission to the bar . . . .”),
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009StandardsWebContent/Chapt
er%203.pdf.
21

Other bar courses are required during students’ second and third
years. University of Arkansas School of Law Catalog of Studies 2008-2009 8-9,
http://law.uark.edu/documents/Catalog_of_Studies_2008-09_(WEB).pdf.
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Moreover, for first-year students, the bar exam is at least two years
away and therefore hardly on the forefront of their minds. For
good reason, students’ attention is more properly focused on
digesting their first-year experiences and applying those
experiences more broadly to the balance of their law school
careers. After all, students must graduate before taking the bar
exam becomes an option.
Finally, any effort to “teach to the bar” presumes that all students
will take the bar, and all students will take the same bar. Given the
frequent refrain (from non-lawyers that is) that “there’s so much
you can do with a law degree,” it bears noting that many students
who attend and graduate from law school may never seek to gain
admission to practice law in any jurisdiction.
A few more problems with this approach – specific to the criminal
law course – leap off the page. First, what a boring way to
approach the most interesting subject students will learn in their
first year. Yes, I am biased, but catering exclusively to the bar
exam in this manner ignores penal theory, whether a particular
case or statute actually makes sense, practical pointers, the
development of statutory interpretation skills, and the prospect of
open and honest debate about controversial topics. In essence, the
bar exam model takes the fun out of the course and replaces it
with, well, barbri.
Second, assuming the criminal course has any relevance to
becoming a criminal practitioner, the bar exam lasts for – at most –
three days, whereas the practice of law lasts for a career. It seems,
then, that viewed in this light, the criminal law course can hardly
be expected to produce high quality criminal practitioners if it is
pre-occupied more broadly with helping students become licensed
attorneys.
Finally, “[t]he bar reinforces teaching that the law is fixed, neutral,
and natural, rather than contingent, mutable, and often deeply
flawed.”22 In a course where the correct answer to a student’s
generalized, but thoughtful, curiosity so often is “it depends,”
nowhere does this articulate quote resonate more than in the
context of the criminal law.23 Yet, the MBE in particular, by
22

Joan Howarth, Legal Education for a Diverse World: Teaching in
the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927, 929 (1997).
23

A friend of mine teaching criminal law at another law school recently
remarked to me that he refuses to answer any student’s questions until they
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testing candidates using exclusively multiple-choice questions,
wholly deemphasizes the need for thoughtful curiosity. Surely,
then, it makes little sense to immediately expose students to an
exam that demands a definitive answer one-hundred percent of the
time. One overarching goal of any effective criminal law course
must be emphasizing to students that identifying applicable
doctrine is the beginning of the analysis rather than the end.
Criminal law, as a course, should more properly be understood to
introduce students to general theories of punishment, general
principles and elements of criminality, general theories of
accountability, and general principles of defense.24 Once that
background is firmly engrained in the minds of students, these
general principles can then be discussed through specific crimes or
defenses. Along the way, students are of course tasked with
reading numerous appellate cases. Each case, properly taught,
should therefore invite meticulous discussion of the facts,
procedures, issues, holdings, reasoning; what the cases stand for
and how they might apply to other fact situations; and underlying
policies and principles. The underlying but no doubt overarching
thematic message to students throughout the semester should be
clear: careful case reading, case analysis, and case briefing (note
taking) are important not just in class, but in professional life.
Perhaps some version of the foregoing approach applies to all firstyear doctrinal courses. But, the criminal course does have one
unique attribute not fairly raised in the balance of the first-year
curriculum: statutory interpretation. The value of inculcating
students with the importance of developing statutory interpretation
skills cannot be overstated. Many of the other first-year courses
are so deeply mired in the common law that, by the time students
make it to a the second year, the only exposure to statutory
language they have had comes from the criminal course.25 Small
wonder, then, that students view reading the text of a statute with
disdain when they reach their upper-level statute-laden courses
(antitrust, secured transactions, corporations . . .). One wonders

articulate a context and jurisdiction for their question. In addition to being a
good idea, his remark reminds us how often the answer to a substantive criminal
law question so often changes based simply on a change in jurisdiction.
24

“General”, in this context, means generally applicable to all crimes.

25

I say that with the important caveat that the civil procedure course
also at least preliminarily exposes students to the importance of reading rules
carefully. I am, however, skeptical that students continue to develop needed
statutory interpretation skills in the context of the federal rules or the wellsettled language of venue, transfer, or subject-matter jurisdiction statutes.
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how far that disdain reaches (raise your hand if you need a
reference librarian to help you with legislative history research).
Some final reminders
Let me conclude by offering just a few generalized observations
about teaching this generation of law students. First, an obvious
point, but one I struggle to remain cognizant of – go slow, keeping
in mind that perspective is everything. Think hard now, but
remember sitting on the other side of the podium? Remember
when you did not even know how the court system was organized?
How about when you needed to keep a copy of Black’s Law
Dictionary next to you at all times just to navigate a judicial
opinion? Even if your memory is hazy on these points (or if you
exited the womb armed with this knowledge), I have learned that
meaningfully acknowledging in class the challenges of first-year
student life goes a long way in earning the trust of a classroom.
Second, expect the unexpected, particularly in the first semester. I
will forever have tattooed on my memory my fall 2008 criminal
law class’s discussion of State v. Alston.26 Briefly, in Alston,
defendant successfully appealed his conviction for forcible rape,
which arose from a particular sexual incident with his exgirlfriend, with whom he had a sexual history both before and after
the incident in question. Indeed, after the incident in question,
when defendant learned that the victim had complained to the
police about the circumstances of their earlier encounter, he
approached the victim’s apartment and gained entry after
threatening to kick her door down. Once inside, defendant began
kissing the victim and ultimately carried her into the bedroom.
The court’s opinion thereafter relayed the following about their
post-incident relations: “He performed oral sex on her and she
testified that she did not try to fight him off because she found she
enjoyed it. The two stayed together until morning and had sexual
intercourse several times that night.”27
Seizing on the class’s lively discussion about the controversial
nature of the court’s reversal of defendant’s conviction, I pushed a
little further, inquiring of the class whether even this post-incident
intercourse could satisfy the elements of North Carolina’s forcible
rape statute. A hand immediately went up. “Yes, what do you
think?” I asked, acknowledging the eager female student. “Well,

26

312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).

27

Id. at 473.

16

the victim said she enjoyed the oral sex. That means, you know,
that she was revved up. And you have to be pretty revved up for
sex – you know, wet?” I would tell you how I responded, but I
think I blacked out for a minute.
Finally, work to humanize the law school experience while
balancing the need to hold students accountable. I have heard
others describe this generation of students as the “entitled
generation.”28 Although I am not willing to go that far in my
assessment, I will concede that a healthy fraction of students have
unrealistic expectations about either their place in the legal
profession in terms of prestige/salary, or the ease with which they
expect to succeed in law school.
A charitable explanation for this is that we professors simply
misconstrue our students.
On the subject of their future
employment, perhaps they are simply bright-eyed and excited
about being the next big thing, be it in private practice, non-profit,
or government work. And, on the subject of law school work
ethic, a part of me cannot help but point the finger inward.
Perhaps, as I noted above, we professors have not taught the basics
– how to take notes, draft an outline, or study for an exam – early
enough for them to become culturally engrained.
Of course, a less charitable interpretation of modern student
behavior is that this generation of students has, in fact, grown up in
an environment that produces in them a sense of entitlement. Like
so many things in the law (and in law school), the answer lies
somewhere in the middle. Although I firmly believe that finding
“the middle” is a personal and evolving process from professor to
professor, I would argue that on the one hand we must be
accessible to our students. By accessible, I mean being in your
office during office hours and not getting antsy about returning to
your scholarship when the student’s questions run longer than five
minutes. On the other hand, I would further argue that we need to
hold our students accountable by, for example, calling on them
when they are quite clearly elbow deep in instant messaging (e.g.,
they are laughing but you did not say anything funny) or

28

In fact, a recent study determined that students expected Bs simply
because they attended class or completed the readings. Max Roosevelt, Student
Expectations Seen As Causing Grade Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at
A15 (noting that students’ sense of entitlement “could be related to increased
parental pressure, competition among peers and family members and a
heightened sense of achievement anxiety”).
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penalizing the owner of a cell phone that rings in class.29 I will
save the attendance debate for another day, but suffice it to say that
each of us should find a way to hold students accountable in some
manner, keeping in mind that they will be representing clients in
the not so distant future.
Conclusion
I thoroughly enjoyed my experience teaching first-year criminal
law in the fall of 2008. After completing that semester, and
reflecting on what else I could have focused on during those short
months, I could not help but wonder (1) if my students had learned
as much as I had hoped; (2) whether I had covered a sufficient
amount of material; and (3) whether three credits is a sufficient
allocation to the criminal law course. I hope my musings on these
and related topics have, at a minimum, inspired a few of you to
rethink portions of your syllabus, course organization, course
coverage and, for extra credit, the prospect of thematically relaying
to your students how they might enjoy success in law school both
in your class and beyond.

29

Although a touch off-topic, it seems that we, as an Academy, need to
dispense with treating upper-level students differently from first-year students.
Too many times I have heard fellow members of the academy make excuses for
upper-level students who are unprepared in class; “they’re interviewing,” “it’s
the second semester,” or “it’s just that time of the semester” are a few that come
to mind. It strikes me that the legal world is filled with bosses, clients, and
judges who may not be so lenient on such basic issues.
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